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OFF THE CHAIN! A GUIDE TO BLOCKCHAIN
DERIVATIVES MARKETS AND THE
IMPLICATIONS ON SYSTEMIC RISK
Ryan Surujnath*
Blockchains are publicly viewable and theoretically unalterable
records of bitcoin transactions. They are thus crucial to the
functionality of cryptocurrencies. Through the blockchain, bitcoin
algorithmically decentralizes the maintenance of the transaction
ledger and delegates the task to users on its network.
Blockchain technology shows promise beyond cryptocurrency:
banking and financial institutions have established partnerships with
fintech firms to explore the applicability of blockchains in capital
markets. Blockchains, used in conjunction with self-executing smartcontracts, present particularly compelling opportunities in derivatives
markets, which are typically beset by numerous intermediaries. The
blockchain could radically reinvent the existing market infrastructure.
Certain intermediaries like central counterparties could become
redundant or see abbreviated functionality. If this happens, the current
body of derivatives laws and regulations would need to be amended
to reflect these changes.
This Note examines the blockchain’s functionality and its
applicability to derivatives markets. It discusses the current state of
derivatives regulation, including the mandatory clearing mandate
imposed by Title VII of Dodd-Frank. This Note argues that the current
regulatory scheme is underpinned by a need to reduce the systemic
risks posed by derivatives and that the new regulatory blueprint for
blockchain derivatives markets should consequently be motivated by
a reduction of the systemic risks inherent in the technology itself.
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INTRODUCTION
It has been seven years since a person (or persons), writing under the
pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto, proposed a radical plan for a decentralized
and completely digital currency. 1 Nakamoto’s opus, published as the
world’s financial markets reeled from one of the worst crises in recent
memory, envisioned a structure where the systems typically monopolized
by sophisticated intermediaries could be crowdsourced to members on a
common network. 2 Bitcoin captured the imaginations of those who
yearned for a more egalitarian economy. Free from government control,
1. See generally SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC
CASH SYSTEM (2008), http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CHK-MUNP].
For years, journalists have speculated on Nakamoto’s true identity. Suspects have
included a model train collector from Los Angeles and, most recently, an Australian
computer scientist. See James Titcomb, Satoshi Nakamoto, Whoever That Is, Will Not
Rescue Bitcoin, TELEGRAPH (May 8, 2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2016
/05/08/satoshi-nakamoto-whoever-that-is-will-not-rescue-bitcoin [https://perma.cc/FE8
Q-3PZ9].
2. See generally NAKAMOTO, supra note 1.
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Bitcoin separated economic liberties from political ones.3 Anyone with
access to an internet connection can access Bitcoins. Yet amidst these
lofty aspirations, Bitcoin suffered numerous setbacks, from wild price
fluctuations4 to the infamous Mt. Gox5 and Silk Road6 scandals. Many
question whether Bitcoin can expand beyond a niche, tech-savvy userbase.7 While Bitcoin is still a prominent payment system, new fintech
startups are instead homing in on its underlying technology, the
blockchain. Indeed, “blockchain” is somewhat of a buzzword in the
finance industry these days. Since 2014, venture capital firms have
invested more than $1.2 billion into blockchain startups.8 Wall Street’s
traditional firms find themselves working alongside upstart fintech
companies to apply the technology to today’s capital markets.9
3. See ALEX TAPSCOTT & DON TAPSCOTT, BLOCKCHAIN REVOLUTION: HOW THE
TECHNOLOGY BEHIND BITCOIN IS CHANGING MONEY, BUSINESS, AND THE WORLD 6
(2016).
4. See WINKLEVOSS INDEX, http://winkdex.com [https://perma.cc/MZT2-XKFC]
(providing historical bitcoin pricing data). When dealing with foreign exchange rates,
bitcoin is commonly abbreviated “BTC.” See id. One of the biggest spikes in the
BTC/USD exchange rate was in 2013; it began the year at 1 BTC=13.45 USD. See id. By
early December, the exchange rate had reached its historical high, where 1 BTC roughly
equaled 1140 USD. See id. Observers cite several reasons for the spike, including a bank
bailout in Cyprus that led worried depositors to seek safe havens. See Maureen Farrell,
Bitcoin Prices Surge Post-Cyprus Bailout, CNN MONEY (Mar. 28, 2013), http://money.
cnn.com/2013/03/28/investing/bitcoin-cyprus [https://perma.cc/T493-TCHJ].
5. See Robert McMillan, The Inside Story of Mt. Gox, Bitcoin’s $460 Million
Disaster, WIRED (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/03/bitcoin-exchange [https
://perma.cc/2SQQ-EUGN]. Mt. Gox was the biggest Bitcoin exchange in the world until
more than $460 million in digital currency disappeared from beneath management’s nose.
Id.
6. See Joshua Bearman & Tomer Hanuka, The Rise & Fall of Silk Road, WIRED
(Apr. 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/04/silk-road-1 [https://perma.cc/6EA4-NS
RZ]. Bitcoin was implicated in the Silk Road affair because users paid for illicit goods
using the currency. See id.
7. See Zoe Thomas, Does Bitcoin Still Matter?, BBC (May 6, 2016), http://www.
bbc.com/news/technology-36197703 [https://perma.cc/6548-VZ5U].
8. For a list of blockchain venture capital projects, see Blockchain Venture Capital,
COINDESK, http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-venture-capital [https://perma.cc/QC8T-X
X7J].
9. One such venture is the Hyperledger Project, a collaborative research and
development effort between tech companies and financial institutions led by the Linux
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At their core, blockchains are about trust and transparency among
unknown peers in the absence of mutually agreed upon intermediaries.10
Upon first glance, it seems paradoxical that an industry that thrives on
information asymmetries and market gatekeeping would be so eager to
embrace the technology. However, the potential for blockchains to reduce
transaction costs gives firms reason to believe that the future could hold
truly “frictionless” transactions. 11 While there is great potential for
blockchains to create new efficiencies, regulators must remain on top of
this emergent technology. In derivatives markets, regulators are
especially cognizant of systemic risks that can be transmitted across the
entire economy through tangled webs of connected obligations. On one
hand, blockchains can contribute to the reduction of systemic risks by
crowdsourcing tasks typically conducted by large central counterparties
that assume large amounts of risk. 12 At the same time, the nature of
blockchain technology can create systemic risks of a completely different
character.13
Introducing the blockchain into derivatives markets can distribute
processes typically undertaken by a central counterparty (“CCP”). While
this can produce efficiencies, decentralized systems are not insusceptible
to exploitation by users on the network. The technology itself can serve
as a source of market-wide risk. This Note argues that applying
blockchains to derivatives markets requires regulators to rethink
assumptions about centralization and systemic risks. Part I describes the
function of blockchains, discusses the core processes in derivatives
trades, and explains how blockchains can apply to the markets. Part II
highlights the legal framework governing derivatives trades, focusing
mainly on the central clearing mandate imposed by Title VII of DoddFrank. Part III argues that central clearing presents systemic risks in the
form of over-centralization, and that while blockchains can mitigate these

foundation. See HYPERLEDGER, https://www.hyperledger.org [https://perma.cc/G5PV86GB].
10. See generally Sarah Underwood, Blockchain Beyond Bitcoin, COMM. ACM,
Nov. 2016, at 15.
11. See IBM, BLOCKCHAIN–BUILDING FRICTIONLESS ECOSYSTEMS 4 (2016).
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part III.
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risks to some extent, regulators must tailor any new blockchain-centric
policies to the unique market-wide risks posed by the technology.
I. APPLYING BLOCKCHAINS TO DERIVATIVES MARKETS
A. BUT WHAT IS A BLOCKCHAIN, REALLY?
Those who have heard even a fraction of the industry enthusiasm
might be led to believe that blockchains are elixirs to all the world’s
problems. In part, this is because the most ambitious blockchain
visionaries consider its large-scale applications beyond finance.14 Some
even suggest that blockchains possess sufficient verification mechanisms
to run entire systems of direct democracy, where citizens can securely
vote from a smartphone or other connected device.15 The suggestion is
astounding, especially in a political climate where allegations of voter
fraud and political hacking have become matters of national salience.
How, then, can a blockchain overcome fundamental issues of trust?
Ultimately, blockchain is a development in information
technology. 16 Many enterprises, whether in financial services or
otherwise, need to store important information as data on a central server.
Blockchains can overcome some weaknesses inherent to centralized data
storage. Centralized storage provides a single point of failure that, if
compromised, can harm a business. Most prominently, central servers are
easy targets for malicious hackers to exploit. 17 Sometimes, companies
hold sensitive consumer and employee information on central servers that

14. See Nina Kilbride, Self-Driving Vehicles and Smart Contracts via the
Blockchain, CRYPTOCOINS NEWS (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/selfdriving-vehicles-and-smart-contracts-blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/YVD6-JLWM].
Outside of finance, blockchains show promise when use in conjunction with “Internet of
Things” technology. See id.
15. See generally PHILIP BOUCHER, WHAT IF BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY
REVOLUTIONISED VOTING? (2016), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATA
G/2016/581918/EPRS_ATA(2016)581918_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/RXS3-Q4NW].
16. See MELANIE SWAN, BLOCKCHAIN: BLUEPRINT FOR A NEW ECONOMY (2006).
17. See What is Blockchain Technology? A Step-by-Step Guide for Beginners,
BLOCKGEEKS, http://blockgeeks.com/guides/what-is-blockchain-technology [https://per
ma.cc/36AL-WWCC].
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are subject to dubious data protection standards.18 Hackers can then leak
information online, forcing the affected company to incur reputational
and financial costs to repair the damage.19 Less dramatically, the system
can be subject to bottlenecks or crashes if too many users access it at the
same time.
In addition, a centralized system may be inefficient for organizations
that must constantly modify and monitor arrangements with other parties.
Consider an arrangement among a supplier, a buyer, and the bank
effectuating payment. Each of these entities may need to collaborate on
different aspects of the transaction. One of the hallmarks of centralized
databases, however, is that only one copy of a record exists at a time. To
borrow a simple, but apt, analogy by venture capitalist William
Mougayar, this is the equivalent of two parties attempting to draft a
contract by making revisions in Microsoft Word. 20 In comparison,
blockchains are analogous to Google Docs. 21 With Google Docs,
collaborating parties can grant permissions authorizing others to access
or edit a document.22
A blockchain is a distributed ledger, where every participant on a
network has the same copy of a record. 23 Blockchain networks are
continually reconciled, meaning that the blockchain updates itself roughly

18. See Peter Elkind, Inside the Hack of the Century, FORTUNE (June 25, 2015),
http://fortune.com/sony-hack-part-1 [https://perma.cc/7M74-Y6PT]. Fortune’s threepart investigation delved into the infamous 2014 cyber-attack on Sony Pictures. See id.
The attack compromised personal information of employees and embarrassing internal
emails concerning ongoing movie negotiations. See id. While Sony maintained that its
defenses were adequate, the article suggests that it failed to implement basic safeguards.
See id. More concerning is the fact that inadequate data protection is not atypical, as
experts say that “outmoded [cybersecurity] practices are the norm at far too many
companies.” Id.
19. See, e.g., Ingrid Lunden, Target Says Credit Card Data Breach Cost It $162M
in 2013-14, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 25, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/02/25/targetsays-credit-card-data-breach-cost-it-162m-in-2013-14 [https://perma.cc/4PPM-2HDA].
20. See William Mougayar, Explaining the Blockchain via a Google Docs Analogy,
STARTUP MGMT. BLOG (Sept. 6, 2016), http://startupmanagement.org/2016/09/06/explai
ning-the-blockchain-via-a-google-docs-analogy [https://perma.cc/BP6Q-ZRNB].
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See What is Blockchain Technology, supra note 17.
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every ten minutes to reflect changes that occurred since the last update.24
Because every participant on the network has an equally viable and
current version of the ledger from which to work, the entire enterprise
need not cease to function if a central database fails; if one participant
loses its record for some reason, everyone else can keep going.25
The specific operation of the blockchain differs among various
types—Ethereum’s blockchain may differ from IBM’s—but the guiding
principles remain the same. The blockchain itself serves as a record of
information.26 Network participants verify the transactions by their peers,
but only rightful asset holders have cryptographic keys to their accounts.27
When an asset holder transacts on the blockchain, it proposes an
amendment to the ledger, and the rest of the network verifies that the
transaction is legitimate.28 By these methods, the members of the network
need not trust one another as long as they trust the computing process. To
understand the details of how the process works, consider the
blockchain’s first and most successful application: Bitcoin.
B. BITCOINS, BLOCKCHAINS, AND SMART CONTRACTS
Initially, blockchains were not designed for use with securities,
derivatives, or traditional capital markets. Instead, they were integral to
the functionality of digital currencies, most notably Bitcoin. 29 By
removing intermediaries from payment clearing, cryptocurrencies

24.
25.
26.

See id.
See id.
See Casey C. Sullivan, How Blockchain Could Improve Record Keeping,
FINDLAW (Mar. 22, 2017), http://blogs.findlaw.com/technologist/2017/03/how-block
chain-could-improve-legal-record-keeping.html [https://perma.cc/62BE-EA5C]. The
blockchain’s record-keeping functions can have serious implications for legal
professionals. See id.
27. See William Mougayar, Understanding the Blockchain, O’REILLY (Jan. 17,
2015), https://www.oreilly.com/ideas/understanding-the-blockchain [https://perma.cc/6
D9V-XCX2].
28. See NAKAMOTO, supra note 1, at 2.
29. Today, there are dozens of cryptocurrencies that use some variant on blockchain
technology. See, e.g., LITECOIN, https://litecoin.org [https://perma.cc/R76Z-BDP4];
DOGECOIN, http://dogepay.com [https://perma.cc/9XGV-HXP5].
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promised to remove the main gatekeepers to sources of capital.30 When
computers solve the cryptographic puzzles, they prove the veracity of the
pending transactions. The blockchains are thus integral to Bitcoin’s
viability.
The early stage of blockchain functionality is often referred to as
“Blockchain 1.0.”31 Recently, however, finance firms have recognized the
potential efficiencies they could realize if they employed blockchains
outside of just cryptocurrencies. The era of “Blockchain 2.0” envisions
wider acceptance of the technology across the financial sector.32 Having
seen the benefits that decentralization affords cryptocurrencies, many on
Wall Street believe that blockchains can streamline existing market
processes and create massive cost savings and efficiencies.33
To understand how blockchains work and the benefits they provide,
it is useful to begin with Blockchain 1.0. While there exist many different
cryptocurrencies, this Note focuses on the two most popular: Bitcoin and
Ethereum. Bitcoin is the most popular cryptocurrency and the progenitor
of blockchains. Thus, there is a large body of work on Bitcoin’s
functionality. Ethereum is the second most prevalent cryptocurrency and
has become a prominent part of “Blockchain 2.0,” thanks to its
implementation of automated, customizable smart contracts.
1. Bitcoin’s Underlying Technology
Transactions that occur in person are straightforward. One party sells
an item of value, and its counterparty pays for the item in cash. The party
30. One of Bitcoin’s earliest promises was the potential for “microfinance.” See
Bitcoinist.net, ProudSource Puts New Spin on Bitcoin Peer-to-peer Lending, INSIDE
BITCOINS (June 5, 2016), http://insidebitcoins.com/news/proudsource-puts-new-spin-onbitcoin-peer-to-peer-lending/32988 [https://perma.cc/T9G5-DE4A]. Because
intermediaries require transacting fees, it is not profitable for traditional lending
institutions to issue small loans to certain populations. By using blockchains as
intermediaries instead, cryptocurrency enthusiasts suggest that peer-to-peer lending
could be a possibility, though there are some obstacles. See id.
31. See, e.g., SWAN, supra note 16.
32. See id.
33. See Robert Hackett, Big Business Giants from Microsoft to J.P. Morgan Are
Getting Behind Ethereum, FORBES (Feb. 27, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/02/28/ethere
um-jpmorgan-microsoft-alliance/ [https://perma.cc/TK6H-CAJW].
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receiving the cash payment can easily confirm the veracity of the
transaction. Ensuring that the money exists and is in the appropriate
amount is merely a matter of counting bills. Once money has been spent
on something, it is, regretfully, gone for good.
Today, simple cash transactions are less commonplace than they
were in the past. This is not a shocking revelation, as the Internet has
displaced cash transactions for years, and credit cards have done the same
for decades. What may be more surprising is the pervasiveness of asset
digitization and its status as a preferred payment method. With Venmo,
for example, users with a bank account or credit card can transfer
electronic funds to one another with their smartphones.34 Some European
countries are even attempting to forsake cash altogether: in Denmark, a
pending law would allow some merchants to reject cash payments, while
Norway aims to become completely cash-free by 2020.35
The digitization of cash, while convenient, presents challenges
regarding transaction verification. Coders call this the “double spending
problem”: if money amounts to ones and zeroes, what is stopping an
opportunistic buyer from copying the code and sending it to multiple
parties, as one would do to a common image or document file?36 With the
blockchain, Bitcoin addressed the double spending problem in a unique
way: it removed the intermediaries that are usually crucial to digital
spending platforms and crowdsourced the task to members of the
network.37 Though the parties on the network do not know one another
and thus have no reason to trust one another, they all accept the code as
the ultimate arbiter of truth. Transaction verification on the blockchain
involves a communal search for the truth; once a user finds the correct
values, the network universally adopts this as the true account of a
transaction.38

34.
35.

See VENMO, https://venmo.com/about/product/ [https://perma.cc/BL67-QCK4].
See Is Cash an Endangered Species?, BNP PARIBAS (Aug. 14, 2015), https://gro
up.bnpparibas/en/news/cash-endangered-species [https://perma.cc/7JTW-XDAB].
36. See TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 3, at 10.
37. See Matt Reynolds, Cash, Fear, and Uncertainty: The Holy Trinity of Bitcoin
and Blockchain, REGISTER (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/04/12/bit
coin_blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/ZB5D-5WBH].
38. See generally Leslie Lamport, Robert Shostak & Marshall Pease, The Byzantine
Generals Problem, 4 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON PROGRAMMING LANGUAGE & SYS. 382
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The Bitcoin blockchain manufactures trust by creating a proof of
work problem.39 To verify a transaction, computers on the network must
produce a particular set of data.40 To do so, they solve an algorithmic
problem. 41 The problem is computationally tedious; there is no
mathematical “shortcut,” no way to cut corners, and users must expend
resources (time, computing power, hardware costs, electricity) to solve
it.42 While the problem is difficult for systems to solve, it should be easy
for members on the network to check transactions against the public
ledger.43
To understand how proof of work blockchains operate, consider the
anatomy of a simple Bitcoin transaction. Suppose that Alice wants to pay
Bob.44 Both Alice and Bob have wallets on their computers, which store
(1982). See also Bitcoin and the Byzantine Generals Problem, WEUSECOINS (July 13,
2015), https://www.weusecoins.com/bitcoin-byzantine-generals-problem/ [https://perm
a.cc/MG59-NDVW]. In computer science lingo, the underlying issue that the blockchain
aims to prevent is known as the Byzantine Generals’ Problem. See id. Imagine the
Byzantine army laying siege to a city. The city is surrounded by different Byzantine
legions, each commanded by a different general. There is disagreement about the best
course of action. Some generals want to attack the city, while others want to retreat.
Whatever the decision, it is important that the action is universally agreed upon, since a
half-hearted strategy would result in more casualties than a unified attack or retreat. The
issue is complicated by traitorous generals who may strategically cast conflicting votes
to maximize casualties. There are also communication difficulties, since the generals’
messengers may be killed before communicating a vote. Bitcoin and other decentralized
networks face this problem. See id. The network functions only if all parties are able to
agree on the veracity of a transaction. See id. Any disagreements pertaining to the true
state of affairs undermines confidence in the system. See id. The point of the code is for
the network to resolve any differences in the verifying systems’ “opinions” of a
transaction. See id.
39. See Daniel Krawisz, The Proof of Work Concept, SATOSHI NAKAMOTO INST.
(June 24, 2013), http://nakamotoinstitute.org/mempool/the-proof-of-work-concept/ [http
s://perma.cc/N2JH-K6LC]; see also Khan Academy, Bitcoin–Proof of Work, YOUTUBE
(May 1, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9V1bipPkCTU.
40. See Krawisz, supra note 39.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. The Alice and Bob hypothetical is commonly used to describe bitcoin
transactions. See, e.g., How Do Bitcoin Transactions Work?, COINDESK (Mar. 20, 2015),
www.coindesk.com/information/how-do-bitcoin-transactions-work [https://perma.cc/JL
6V-XFZU].
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information pertaining to their Bitcoin addresses.45 Visually, an address
is a string of letters and numbers, but each address has its own Bitcoin
balance.46 To accept payment, Bob creates a new address.47 Alice tells the
Bitcoin client that she wants to send payment to Bob’s new address.48
Had Alice and Bob kept traditional books and records, recording the
transaction would be simple: Alice’s books would record the transaction
as a credit and Bob’s books would contain a corresponding debit. 49
Recordation into the blockchain ledger, however, requires a third entry—
a cryptographic seal.50 To do this, Bitcoin uses public key cryptography.51
Both Alice and Bob have addresses that they can disseminate publicly.52
Additionally, Alice and Bob both have private keys, which are kept secret
and derived from their addresses through a cryptographic sequence.53 To
facilitate payment, Bob gives Alice his address, which serves as a public
key.54 Alice then authorizes the transaction by “signing” the transfer with
her private key and pairing it with Bob’s public key.55
Once the deal is consummated, the transaction request is broadcast
to the network for verification.56 Miners are participants on the Bitcoin
network who verify transactions for entry onto the blockchain.57 Miners
verify transactions by matching the private key signature to the
transferor’s publicly viewable address. 58 They periodically bundle

45.
46.

See id.
See BLOCKCHAIN, https://blockchain.info [https://perma.cc/3R5A-36JW].
Blockchain.info is the publicly viewable Bitcoin blockchain. Simply click on a block to
see the recent transactions that compose the block. Each transaction appears to be
between two random alpha-numeric strings—these are the addresses.
47. See How Do Bitcoin Transactions Work?, supra note 44.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. Id.
53. See SWAN, supra note 16.
54. See How Do Bitcoin Transactions Work?, supra note 44.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See BITCOINMINING.COM, https://www.bitcoinmining.com/ [https://perma.cc/32
LY-HWLF].
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pending transaction data into blocks. 59 At that point, the miners’
computers must solve the proof of work problem to essentially convert
the raw transaction data into a form that is useful for systems accessing
the blockchain.60
The proof of work problem requires miners to undergo a process
called cryptographic hashing. 61 Hashing is an integral concept behind
blockchain.62 Any data set can be run through a hashing algorithm that
produces a hash value, a unique alphanumeric string. 63 Even small
changes to the input data can produce radically different hashes.64 There
is no way for a user to predict what hash a data set may produce without
running it through the algorithm.65 Ultimately, miners want to produce a
hash that is beneath a certain target value set by the network. 66 The
blockchain determines the target value to adjust the difficulty of the proof
of work problem. 67 As more miners participate in the transaction
verification process, the total processing power on the network
increases. 68 The Bitcoin chain adjusts the target value to reflect these
changes; by creating a lower target value, the blockchain decreases the
number of viable solutions to a proof of work problem, making it more
difficult. 69 To solve the proof of work problem, miners will use three
pieces of data as inputs for the hashing algorithm: the transaction block
they just formed, the hash from the previous block on the blockchain, and
59.
60.
61.

See id.
See id.
The Disruptor Series: Digital Currency and Blockchain Technology: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. of Commerce, Manufacturing & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy
& Commerce, 114th Cong. 47 (2016) (testimony by Paul Snow, Chief Architect and CoFounder, Fatcom, Inc.).
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. The target value sets the difficulty of the proof of work problem. The fewer
acceptable values there are, the harder it is to solve the problem. Bitcoin does this because
it wants to limit how many Bitcoins are in circulation. See FAQ, BITCOIN,
https://bitcoin.org/en/faq [https://perma.cc/LZ3M-TQ7Z]; see also Krawisz, supra note
39.
67. See BITCOINMINING.COM, supra note 58.
68. See id.
69. See id.

2017]

OFF THE CHAIN! A GUIDE TO
BLOCKCHAIN DERIVATIVES MARKETS

269

an arbitrary number called a nonce.70 A nonce is a variable, while the
other inputs are constants. By changing the nonce, miners can produce
different hash values even if the other input data remains the same.71
At this point, the grunt work begins. Miners will expend resources to
find a nonce that will produce a hash that is beneath the target value.72
They compete against one another in this endeavor, motivated by the
promise of a Bitcoin bounty to the first miner to find an acceptable hash.
The process is computationally tedious.73 It is akin to plugging in values
for variables in algebraic equations until happening upon the correct
solution. 74 Unlike simple algebra, however, there is no formula or
shortcut that simply “solves for x.” The only way for miners to get an edge
over the others is to purchase specialized hardware or mine in collective
pools to increase the rate at which their systems run through the hashing
algorithm.75 While this helps, stumbling upon the correct hash value is
still a matter of probability.76
When a miner finds the solution to the proof of work problem, it
broadcasts the completed block to all the nodes on the network.77 Nodes
are connected systems that accept blocks by checking them against the
network’s acceptance criteria; if the block shows a double-spent coin, for
example, the node will reject the block.78 A node accepts a block by using
the hash value of the completed block as the header for the next block in
the chain.79 Nodes always accept the longest chain of blocks to be the
network’s “truth.”80 If a node receives conflicting blocks, it will begin
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See id.
See id.
See Krawisz, supra note 39.
See BITCOINMINING.COM, supra note 58.
See Krawisz, supra note 39.
See Bitcoin Mining Hardware Guide, BITCOINMINING.COM, https://www.bitcoin
mining.com/bitcoin-mining-hardware/ [https://perma.cc/F35A-46YE]. Today, most
mining occurs by collective pools rather than individuals. See Jordan Tuwiner, Bitcoin
Mining Pools, BITCOIN WORLDWIDE (Mar. 25, 2017), https://bitcoinworldwide.com/mini
ng/pools/ [https://perma.cc/J7CE-28RZ].
76. See BITCOINMINING.COM, supra note 58.
77. See NAKAMOTO, supra note 1, at 3.
78. See id.; see also, e.g., Bitcoin Core, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/bitcoin-core/
[https://perma.cc/6AKC-VGCK].
79. See Krawisz, supra note 39.
80. NAKAMOTO, supra note 1, at 3.
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working on the one it receives first.81 It saves the conflicting block, as
other nodes also begin work on whichever one they receive first.82 The
node will switch to the block that becomes longer and more widely
accepted.83
There are variations to this formula, but the proof of work
mechanism was the initial model posed by Nakamoto and is still
employed by Bitcoin. Most blockchains operate on some derivation of
this formula, and the Bitcoin blockchain demonstrates the basic precepts
of communal payment verification.
2. From Cash to Securities: Smart Contracts
Smart contracts are crucial in guiding the transition from Blockchain
1.0 to Blockchain 2.0. The term “smart contract” is a nebulous concept.
As it is somewhat of a marketing buzzword, it is often used as a catch-all
term to describe a host of online activity. 84 Lawyer and computer
programmer Nick Szabo first defined the term in 1994. Szabo described
a smart contract as:
[A] computerized transaction protocol that executes the terms of a
contract. The general objectives . . . are to satisfy common contractual
conditions (such as payment terms, liens, confidentiality, and even
enforcement), minimize exceptions both malicious and accidental,
and minimize the need for trusted intermediaries. Related economic
goals include lowering fraud loss, arbitration and enforcement costs,
and other transaction costs.85

Much of the ambiguity surrounding smart contracts stems from the
interplay between the traditional legal understanding of contracts and the

81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Florian Glatz, What Are Smart Contracts?, MEDIUM (Dec. 11, 2014), https://
medium.com/@heckerhut/whats-a-smart-contract-in-search-of-a-consensus-c268c830a
8ad [https://perma.cc/6X2X-8ZZR].
85. TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 3, at 56 (citing NICK SZABO, THE IDEA OF
SMART CONTRACTS (1997), http://szabo.best.vwh.net/smart_contracts_idea.html [https://
perma.cc/V6AZ-7V8W]).
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“smart” aspect of the code.86 Many online activities are governed by code
and are legally relevant but lack the legal elements of contract
formation.87
Smart contracts rest on the idea that the code can enforce and execute
the terms of the agreement. A smart contract is “self-enforcing” if the
software executes the terms without additional input from the parties.88
This allows an arrangement to occur even in the absence of trust.89 For
example, Szabo considered a simple smart contract governing a car loan.90
The loan’s terms are expressed in code and programmed into the car.91
The contract no longer hinges on the debtor’s willingness to abide by its
terms; if the debtor has the means to do so, the software ensures that he
or she makes the payments.92 If the debtor cannot make the payments, the
smart contract invokes a lien by revoking the debtor’s permission to start
the ignition.93 This hypothetical loan also highlights the smart contract’s
cost saving benefits. The bank does not need to devote manpower to
constantly monitor the status of each loan and handle the paperwork
required to invoke a traditional lien. It does not need to hire a debt
collector, nor does it need to contend with the possibility that an
unscrupulous repo man may expose it to additional liability.
Szabo’s ideas were ahead of their time in the mid-1990s (though
perhaps somewhat prophetic of today’s era of driverless cars). Most smart
contracts, to this point, have not demonstrated quite the same ability to
process inputs as Szabo envisioned. Their most common use has been in
multimedia digital rights management (“DRM”).94 Purchasing or renting
86. Riikka Koulu, Blockchains and Online Dispute Resolution: Smart Contracts as
an Alternative to Enforcement, 13 SCRIPTED 40, 41 (2016).
87. See Glatz, supra note 84.
88. See Koulu, supra note 86, at 54.
89. See id.
90. See TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 3, at 56.
91. See id.
92. See Koulu, supra note 86, at 47.
93. See SZABO, supra note 85. Of course, Szabo recognized some of the potential
drawbacks of this specific arrangement. It would, for example, be inconvenient if the
bank decided to seize its collateral this way while the debtor was driving on the thruway.
Id.
94. See Glatz, supra note 84; see also Lex Disturbia: The Impact of Smart Contracts
on the Law, GOWLING WLG (Mar. 16, 2016), https://gowlingwlg.com/en/canada/insights
-resources/lex-disturbia-the-impact-of-smart-contracts-on-the-law [https://perma.cc/66G
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content on iTunes or a comparable service amounts to acquiring a limited
use license. For example, users can view rental content only over a limited
period, they can access music only on a certain number of compliant
devices, and they can burn audio playlists to CDs only a few times.95
DRM arrangements achieve results without assuming monitoring
and enforcement costs by making it impossible for users to violate the
smart contract. Each song contains software that serves as the agreement’s
monitoring mechanism.96 A movie rental, for example, is time stamped
when the user begins watching it. After twenty-four hours, the software
revokes the user’s ability to access the video.97 Yet DRM smart contracts
are limited in their abilities. Unlike Szabo’s utopian agreements, iTunes
DRM does not process inputs and cannot apply the contract’s terms.98 It
thus has restricted functionality. Unlike simplistic DRM, smart contracts
going forward can use the blockchain’s computational power and allocate
the underlying assets once the agreement’s conditions are calculated and
satisfied.
Smart contracts uploaded to blockchains are programmed in code
that embodies the “terms” of the agreement. In a way, the coded language
of a smart contract is less obtuse than that of its written counterpart. To
laypersons, traditional contracts evoke images of dense text walls,
impenetrable legalese, and linguistic butchery designed to mitigate
liability. But smart contracts reduce each term to its basic component in

G-VMTY]; Jeffrey Glazer, Smart Contracts Are a Future, U. WIS. L. SCH. L. &
ENTREPRENEURSHIP CLINIC BLOG (Sept. 14, 2015), https://www.uwle.org/blog/smartcontracts-are-a-future [https://perma.cc/S8DF-75DJ]; Dean Walsh, A Beginner’s Guide
to Smart Contracts, CRYPTORIALS (Mar. 10, 2015), http://cryptorials.io/a-beginnersguide-to-smart-contracts/ [https://perma.cc/KXF6-CQAM]. iTunes, Netflix, and other
content providers serve as distributors, taking a portion of revenue from media sales in
exchange for managing digital rights. Blockchain smart contracts are being used to allow
creators to distribute and monetize content while managing digital rights. See Joseph
Young, SingularDTV: A Decentralized “Netflix” on Ethereum, BITCOIN MAG. (Sept. 1,
2016), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/singulardtv-a-decentralized-netflix-on-ether
eum-1472760808/ [https://perma.cc/GTL8-NKMC].
95. See Apple Media Services Terms and Conditions, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/
legal/internet-services/itunes/us/terms.html [https://perma.cc/PEV8-N5EL].
96. See Glazer, supra note 94.
97. See Apple Media Services Terms and Conditions, supra note 95.
98. See Dean Walsh, supra note 94.
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the form of “if/then” statements.99 For all their programming complexity,
it may be best to think of smart contracts as conditional payments.100
The process by which a smart contract is uploaded to the blockchain
varies across the different types of blockchains. Because smart contracts
are customizable and can be used for a variety of purposes, it is
advantageous to use a blockchain that supports a wide range of
programming languages. Bitcoin’s chief competitor, Ethereum, was
specifically designed for smart contracts, and thus permits users more
freedom in drafting their programs.101
The process of uploading a smart contract to the Ethereum
blockchain is not dissimilar from the Bitcoin transacting process
discussed earlier.102 The user does so through a transaction containing the
smart contract’s code. 103 This special transaction does not go to the
counterparty’s address, as with a normal Bitcoin transaction.104 Instead,
nodes on the network recognize the smart contract and create a special
address for it.105 The parties can later trigger the contract by sending a
transaction request to the smart contract’s address that fulfills the
conditions necessary for the contract’s execution.106 Triggering a smart
contract can result in a chain reaction: it can automatically lead to another
transaction request, which may trigger another smart contract, and the
process can theoretically repeat itself an infinite number of times.107 This
means that satisfying a single condition can trigger a series of smart
contracts that are contingent on that obligation.
There must then be a way for the blockchain to monitor these
triggering conditions. The blockchain, however, cannot keep track of
every parameter that can influence the activation of a contract. Multi99. See Christopher Burniske, Bitcoin and Ethereum: How Smart Contracts Work,
ARK INV. (May 29, 2016), https://ark-invest.com/research/smart-contracts-work [https://
perma.cc/2M6L-NRW6].
100. See About SmartContract.com, SMARTCONTRACT, http://about.smartcontract.c
om [https://perma.cc/U5YD-94HK].
101. See Burniske, supra note 99.
102. See About SmartContract.com, supra note 100.
103. See id.
104. See Burniske, supra note 99.
105. See About SmartContract.com, supra note 100.
106. See Burniske, supra note 99.
107. See About SmartContract.com, supra note 100.
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signatures and oracles resolve this problem by keeping track of
information off the blockchain and providing a trusted signature once a
condition to the contract is satisfied.
As the name suggests, multi-signature (or multi-sig) allows for more
than two parties to enter into an agreement. With a “2-of-3” contract, there
are three parties to the agreement and the contract requires two parties to
sign with their private keys.108 This can create escrows by allowing buyers
to commit money to sellers and to third parties. If the parties consummate
the transaction without issue, the buyer and seller sign the agreement, and
the payment goes through. In the event of a dispute, the third party can
arbitrate the dispute and release the funds.109
Oracles use multi-sig to incorporate outside information into the
blockchain. An oracle serves as an additional signatory that attests to
information that is not tracked by the blockchain.110 It can reference an
agreed upon data source and serve as an additional signature to a
transaction that is contingent on a real-world event.111 Once the required
condition is met, the oracle signs the transaction with its private key to
effectuate the transaction.112 In a trading system that relies on numerous
ledgers to keep track of different assets, the oracle can facilitate a payment
that is contingent on a factor tracked by another blockchain.
Smart contract technology is still very much in its early stages of
development, so some of the advantages and disadvantages may not be
clear yet. But even as of now, the technology is compelling enough to
attract significant investment.

108. The typical notation used to describe multi-sig arrangement is an “X-of-Y”
contract where Y is the number of parties and X is the number of signatures needed to
authorize the transaction. See Ben Davenport, What Is Multisig, and What Can It Do?,
COINCENTER (Jan. 1, 2015), https://coincenter.org/entry/what-is-multi-sig-and-what-canit-do [https://perma.cc/4W5Y-422X].
109. See id.
110. See Vitalik Buterin, Ethereum and Oracles, ETHEREUM BLOG (July 22, 2014),
https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/07/22/ethereum-and-oracles/ [https://perma.cc/9T9T-Q
XFN].
111. See id.
112. See About SmartContract.com, supra note 100.
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C. THE MODERN DERIVATIVES INDUSTRY
While blockchains and smart contracts are at the cutting edge of
finance, derivatives have existed for centuries. 113 Some of the earliest
credit derivatives date back to twelfth century Venice, when concerned
financiers sought insurance against the possibility that overseas trading
ships would get lost at sea.114 For most of recorded history, derivatives
have been used as hedging mechanisms in commodities industries. 115
Contemporary derivatives agreements play an important role in the
hedging strategies of banks and other financial institutions. Derivatives
markets could be at the precipice of a major change, but there are risks
inherent in the use of such instruments.
There are several general types of derivatives. Forward agreements
specify later delivery of a quantity of assets at an agreed upon price.116
Futures are standardized forwards that are traded on an exchange. 117
Options give the holder a right, though not an obligation, to purchase the
underlying asset at a specified price.118 Swaps involve exchanges of cash
flows based on a notional amount named in the agreement. 119 Some
complex instruments may involve a combination of the different
archetypes.
Derivatives trades can occur either through exchanges or over-thecounter (“OTC”). 120 Exchange-traded derivatives must be highly
standardized and liquid.121 Parties to these agreements have fewer choices
regarding underlying assets, settlement amounts, maturity dates, and

113. See Michael Chui, Derivatives Markets, Products, and Participants, in IFC
BULLETIN NO. 35: DATA REQUIREMENTS FOR MONITORING DERIVATIVE TRANSACTIONS
3, 4 (2012), http://www.bis.org/ifc/publ/ifcb35.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQ3U-7RU8].
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. Id. at 5.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See DEUTSCHE BÖRSE GRP., THE GLOBAL DERIVATIVES MARKET: AN
INTRODUCTION 10 (2008), http://deutsche-boerse.com/blob/2532338/10c3a059fd54aa0b
7a9bee49c470555d/data/the-global-derivatives-market-0508_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z
UL6-FBL4].
121. See id.
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other contractual terms.122 Centralized entities can provide credit support
to ensure execution of the contract and can monitor trading practices.123
Conversely, OTC derivatives are individually negotiated. They are often
bespoke and designed to deal with very specific types of risks.124 Their
terms are variable and consequently allow for limitless speculative or
hedging potential. 125 However, the specificity of these contracts often
makes them illiquid.126
1. Risks Associated with Derivatives Use
Regardless of their type, a fundamental characteristic of derivatives
is long-term risk.127 Regulators often say that they want to curtail risky
practices, but this is a vague proposition when dealing with parties that
quite literally trade in risk. A well-functioning derivatives market is thus
concerned with mitigating unwanted risks.128 Counterparty risk, i.e., the
risk that a counterparty will be unable to fulfill its end of the contract, is
the greatest source of concern for market participants.129 As a form of
credit risk, it measures the degree of exposure a firm has to the potential
default of its counterparty.130 As counterparty risk is an inherent part of
every derivative transaction, it is more difficult to hedge. 131 Market
participants fear a domino effect in which the default of one counterparty
results in defaults of others.132 Because firms will always assume some
degree of counterparty risk in every trade, they tend to offset the risk by
entering into cancelling transactions. 133 An unexpected default by a
122. See Sean Griffith, Substituted Compliance and Systemic Risk: How to Make a
Global Market in Derivatives Regulation, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1291, 1297 (2014).
123. See id.
124. See Zachary J. Gubler, The Financial Innovation Process: Theory and
Application, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 85 (2011).
125. See Griffith, supra note 122, at 1298.
126. See DEUTSCHE BÖRSE GROUP, supra note 120, at 12.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See Gubler, supra note 124, at 60.
130. See RAFFAELE SCALCIONE, THE DERIVATIVES REVOLUTION: A TRAPPED
INNOVATION AND A BLUEPRINT FOR REGULATORY REFORM 72 (2011).
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id.
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counterparty to whom a firm is significantly exposed can cause previously
neutralized risks to re-expose themselves. 134 That is to say, a
counterparty’s default can upset the firm’s balanced position, causing a
scenario where it must re-hedge the affected positions. If the whole
market is suffering from extreme conditions, it may be impossible, or at
least more expensive, to hedge.
2. The Derivative Value Chain
The value chain of a derivative can be divided into three general
stages: pre-trading, trading and clearing, and execution and delivery.135
Pre-trading involves originating and channeling orders to marketplaces.136
During trading, buyers and sellers are matched with one another. 137
Compatible counterparties may then execute the trade by entering into the
derivatives contract.138 At this stage, the contracts are “open;” during the
clearing process, open contracts can be managed and traded again
throughout their maturity. 139 In modern derivatives markets, the posttrading management of the contracts is typically handled by a CCP.140
Finally, once the agreement reaches maturity, the contract is “closed”
either through a cash payment (which occurs in the majority of cases) or
through physical delivery of the underlying asset.141
Pre-trading begins with broker-dealers.142 In exchange-traded deals
they originate orders from their customers and wire those orders to
centralized exchanges called designated contract markets. 143 These
designated contract markets include platforms like the Chicago Board of
Trade or the New York Mercantile Exchange.144 Typically, with these
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

See id.
DEUTSCHE BÖRSE GROUP, supra note 120, at 15.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See 7 U.S.C. § 7 (2012).
See Trading Organizations–Designated Contract Markets, U.S. COMMODITY
FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, http://sirt.cftc.gov/SIRT/SIRT.aspx?Topic=TradingOrgani
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standard agreements, the only negotiable terms are the price terms in
futures or options contracts and the cash delivery amounts in swaps.145
Standardization makes these derivatives highly liquid,146 so the exchange
generally has little difficulty in finding two parties that are willing to
assume different sides of the transaction.
In OTC markets, broker-dealers send the orders to their own
derivatives desks or, if necessary, to other dealers. 147 For swap
agreements, however, the orders are sent to swap execution facilities,
which provide similar pre-trade bid and ask information as the
exchanges. 148 Trading is bilateral; the terms may either resemble
standardized agreements (“look-alikes”) or be specific to each party’s
needs.149 In the latter scenario, the contract could be too illiquid for there
to be a robust secondary market.
Once the parties are matched and a trade is pending, CCPs clear the
trade. CCPs are organizations that consist of member firms which attempt
to reduce the impact of a default on derivative contract obligations.150 The
CCP clears transactions by serving as the “buyer to every seller and the
seller to every buyer.” 151 The CCP inserts itself between both parties
through a process called novation in which the two counterparties contract
with the CCP instead of directly with one another.152 This creates two
contracts: one between the first counterparty and the CCP, and an
offsetting one between the CCP and the second counterparty. 153 The
counterparties are thus not exposed to each other’s credit risk and are only
concerned with the credit risk of the CCP.
zations&implicit=true&type=DCM&CustomColumnDisplay=TTTTTTTT [https://perm
a.cc/WP5L-TN5S].
145. See Thomas E. Lynch, Derivatives: A Twenty First Century Understanding, 43
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 11 (2011).
146. See id.
147. See DEUTSCHE BÖRSE GROUP, supra note 120, at 15.
148. See 7 U.S.C. § 7b-3 (2012).
149. See DEUTSCHE BÖRSE GROUP, supra note 120, at 16.
150. See AMANDEEP REHLON & DAN NIXON, CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES: WHAT ARE
THEY, WHY DO THEY MATTER AND HOW DOES THE BANK SUPERVISE THEM? 1-2 (2013),
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/quarterlybulletin/2013/m13prerele
ase.aspx [https://perma.cc/8TQC-LS2Y].
151. Griffith, supra note 122, at 1312.
152. See REHLON & NIXON, supra note 150, at 4.
153. See Lynch, supra note 145, at 22.
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Because the CCP absorbs all the counterparty risks on the market, it
must guard against its own default through netting and collateralization.154
Netting reduces the number of times cash changes hands.155 When two
parties have several outstanding derivatives contracts with one another,
there will be some winning deals and some losing deals.156 Rather than
paying out each agreement individually, netting allows a party to subtract
its losses from its gains and pay the net result. 157 CCPs engage in
multilateral netting, which leads to movement consolidation among
several clearing members.158 Additionally, when a clearing member first
enters the transaction, the CCP collects an initial margin as a form of
collateral. 159 The requested margin reflects the probability of the
member’s default. 160 For example, NASDAQ’s margining model for
commodities derivatives reflects a 99.2% probability that the margin will
be sufficient to cover a default. 161 CCPs also collect another type of
margin called variation margin to adjust a position through the life of the
trade. 162 Variation margins can result in a transfer of funds from the
member organization to the CCP (or vice versa), depending on the change
in the instrument’s market value. 163 The combination of these
requirements protects CCPs from both future and day-to-day losses.
D. BLOCKCHAIN’S DISRUPTIVE POTENTIAL
The derivatives industry is highly intermediated, and blockchain
computation provides an opportunity for cost reductions and increased
efficiencies. Goldman Sachs estimates that implementing blockchains in
markets for cash securities can result in $11 billion to $12 billion in annual
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

See id.
See id.
See Gubler, supra note 124, at 90.
See id.
See REHLON & NIXON, supra note 150, at 3-4.
See Griffith, supra note 122, at 1302.
See REHLON & NIXON, supra note 150, at 5.
See Margining Methodology, NASDAQ, http://business.nasdaq.com/trade/cleari
ng/nasdaq-clearing/risk-management/margining-methodology [https://perma.cc/ATZ25QQD].
162. See REHLON & NIXON, supra note 150, at 5.
163. See id.
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savings to the banking industry, with additional savings if they were
applied to derivatives markets.164 Banks could see similar reductions in
costs of anti-money laundering and know-your-customer reporting. 165
There have already been small-scale test cases involving successful
transfers of foreign exchange futures and credit-default swaps using
blockchains.166
A blockchain-based derivatives contract market would likely involve
a system of several interoperable ledgers that use multi-sig smart
contracts for effectuating transfers and oracles for asset monitoring and
collateral management.167 Parties to a blockchain derivatives transaction
would submit bids and asks as usual. In OTC markets, dealers could play
a reduced role. Rather than relying on the dealers to match bids and asks,
parties could take advantage of the anonymity provided by the
blockchain, in the same way Bitcoin users do.168 They could upload asks
directly to the blockchain and rely on its computing to automatically
choose the highest bid. 169 Because of public-key cryptography, the
publicly viewable addresses would serve as aliases that conceal
identifying information of the counterparties.
Once the parties are matched, CCPs would novate the agreements.170
As with the current novation process, this would result in two contracts.
The contracts are then uploaded to the derivatives ledger, which contains
the logic and execution algorithms for all the clearing members’
agreements. 171 Posting margin to the CCP involves the use of

164. See THE GOLDMAN SACHS GRP., PROFILES IN INNOVATION: BLOCKCHAIN:
PUTTING THEORY INTO PRACTICE 3 (2016).
165. See MCKINSEY & CO., BEYOND THE HYPE: BLOCKCHAINS IN CAPITAL MARKETS
3 (2015).
166. See Arjun Kharpal, Barclays Used Blockchain Tech to Trade Derivatives, CNBC
(Apr. 19, 2016), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/04/19/barclays-used-blockchain-tech-totrade-derivatives.html [https://perma.cc/7U8Q-2AER].
167. See generally ISDA, THE FUTURE OF DERIVATIVES PROCESSING AND MARKET
INFRASTRUCTURE 23 (2016); OLIVER WYMAN, BLOCKCHAIN IN CAPITAL MARKETS: THE
PRIZE AND THE JOURNEY (2016) (describing one model of an ideal derivatives
blockchain).
168. See WYMAN, supra note 167, at 15.
169. Id. at 11.
170. Id. at 10.
171. Id.
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interoperable collateral and asset ledgers.172 Throughout the lifespan of
the agreement, the collateral ledger uses oracles to reference agreed upon
external data sources (like Bloomberg) to track price movements in the
underlying assets and to automatically adjust positions.173 Rebalancing
happens according to real time fluctuations, which means that collateral
in margin accounts can be allocated more efficiently.174 Execution of the
payments is automated; if additional margin is needed, the ledger
automatically sends a payment request to the clearing member’s address
on the asset ledger.
There is some disagreement among industry stakeholders as to the
degree to which blockchains can displace CCPs as intermediaries in
derivatives trades. The blockchain’s verification mechanism threatens to
eliminate CCPs in securities transactions. Blockchains ensure that both
parties own the asset before the trade is consummated—this would work
in largely the same way that a Bitcoin transaction works and can reduce
counterparty risk without the presence of a CCP. But unlike with
securities, there can be a substantial amount of time between the trade and
settlement of a derivative. 175 Verifying the trade does not eliminate
counterparty risk ten years down the road. 176 For this reason, many
observers believe that CCPs will still be necessary to perform netting; if
the blockchain is unable to net transactions, it could lead to higher
collateral requirements across the board.177 Thus, there is some skepticism
that market participants and regulators will abandon the tried and true
172.
173.

Id.
See Matt O’Brien, Blockchain Technology Will Profoundly Change the
Derivatives Industry, BITCOIN MAG. (May 27, 2016), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/article
s/blockchain-technology-will-profoundly-change-the-derivatives-industry-1464368431
[https://perma.cc/WPJ5-ZZZ3].
174. See COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, PRESS RELEASE NO. 7324-16,
TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING 208 (2016), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/gro
ups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/tac_022316_transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/U
MG9-DGEU].
175. WYMAN, supra note 167, at 10.
176. See German Banking Indus. Comm., Response to ESMA Discussion Paper on
the Distributed Ledger Technology Applied to Securities Markets, https://www.esma.eur
opa.eu/file/19543/download?token=g3KSQoB2 [https://perma.cc/W6ZE-5DC2].
177. See Euroclear Inc., Response to ESMA Discussion Paper on the Distributed
Ledger Technology Applied to Securities Markets, https://www.esma.europa.eu/file/1953
1/download?token=kz0cZ0E2 [https://perma.cc/ZV5G-QXUS].
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“safety net” that CCPs provide. 178 Some are more hawkish on the
blockchain’s displacement potential.
On the other hand, blockchain optimists suggest that an improvised
netting process can occur on the blockchain. For example, in a comment
to the European Securities Market Authority, the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association (“ISDA”) suggested that blockchains can
consolidate trading information over a given period into a single
aggregate movement.179 The blockchain can then lock margin accounts
until they are funded appropriately.180 Some go a step further and suggest
that the simplified settlement process sufficiently reduces counterparty
risk, which makes netting unnecessary.181 This question will be resolved
as the technology matures. Since CCPs provide clear benefits,
blockchains must demonstrate clear efficiencies to displace the current
system.
Even if CCPs retain their functionality, blockchains still provide
efficiencies by serving as platforms for data recording and reporting.
Audits and other regulatory reporting become a pittance—and a potential
boon for regulators.182 By serving as a full node on the blockchain, the
concerned regulator would have a copy of the entire ledger, which
includes information pertaining to every transaction, margin amounts, and
the risk profiles of the participating firms. There needs to be some
tinkering, though: regulators would require modified permissions or an
identification system to de-anonymize the accounts on the blockchain,
and key management, in general, would require great care. 183
Furthermore, authorized parties have access to the smart contracts, which
178.
179.

See THE GOLDMAN SACHS GRP., supra note 164, at 52.
See ISDA, Response to ESMA Discussion Paper on the Distributed Ledger
Technology Applied to Securities Markets, https://www.esma.europa.eu/file/19542/down
load?token=JfoBw0IT [https://perma.cc/7FLX-VLU3].
180. See id.
181. See, e.g., Joe Parsons, Blockchain Startup Aims to Replace Clearing Houses,
TRADE (Oct. 11, 2016), http://www.thetradenews.com/Technology/Blockchain-startupaims-to-replace-clearing-houses/ [https://perma.cc/WQE3-F2DY] (describing a new
blockchain startup that aims to remove clearinghouses from derivatives trades).
182. See Cliff Moyce, How Blockchain Can Revolutionize Regulatory Compliance,
CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (Apr. 9, 2017), http://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.
com/blockchain-regulatory-compliance/ [https://perma.cc/A86H-LSZY].
183. WYMAN, supra note 167, at 15.
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serve as records of ownership and vital transaction information.184 The
self-executing smart contracts can also eliminate the need for some
dispute resolution procedures.185 The blockchain’s automation can yield
reductions in transaction costs that firms usually incur when resolving
contract disputes.
The greatest potential for blockchains likely exists in markets where
there is no CCP: illiquid, non-cleared OTC derivatives markets. 186 In
these markets, blockchains can assume functions typically undertaken by
CCPs. But rather than relying on a single central counterparty, the
blockchain serves as a decentralized clearing network (“DCN”).187 Firms
trading these derivatives could use a blockchain like Ethereum, which
allows users to organize into distributed autonomous organizations
(“DAO”) governed by smart contracts.188 Once the criteria for admission
into the DCN are met, the blockchain manages the functions usually
conducted by the CCP: valuing contracts, calculating initial and variation
margins, facilitating custody of collateral, handling novation and netting,
and managing closeout.189 Derivatives are contracts that have calculable
terms with an “algorithm” expressed through legal terms. 190 Valuation
typically presents a problem in bilateral markets because the two parties
compute the algorithms themselves and may reach different conclusions
on pricing. 191 Blockchains crowdsource the calculations and allow the
network to reach a consensus on their accuracy.192 Proponents hope that
the communal process can result in more transparent OTC markets.193
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See MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 165, at 9.
See id. at 1, 8.
See Ian Rycott, What Every Trader Needs to Know About Blockchain, FI-DESK
(Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.fi-desk.com/derivatives-blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/B57
K-QKFM].
187. See COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, supra note 174, at 194-95.
188. See Distributed Autonomous Organization, ETHEREUM, https://www.ethereum.o
rg/dao [https://perma.cc/QW9C-TW48].
189. See COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, supra note 174, at 195-96.
190. See id. at 196.
191. See id. at 196-97.
192. See id. at 197.
193. See William Shaw, EU Regulator Pushes for Transparency on Nonequity
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Despite their potential to realize new efficiencies, blockchains face
barriers to implementation. A system that is completely reliant on the
blockchain cannot guarantee payments if there is a flaw in contracting.194
One major drawback is the lack of legal recourse for aggrieved parties.195
Irrevocability is a central tenet to the blockchain. 196 It should be
impossible for a single entity to “edit” an entry to the blockchain and
reverse it as if it never happened.197 This can present a problem when
attempting to enact a court-ordered remedy.198 While the smart contract
will undoubtedly resolve some disputes, others will remain. A smart
contract does little to remedy insider trading, and new disputes could arise
if a party believes that the coded logic does not accurately reflect the
agreed upon terms.199
II. CURRENT LEGAL REGIMES GOVERNING BLOCKCHAINS AND
DERIVATIVES
A. THE CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE ON BLOCKCHAINS
Blockchain is still in its formative stages, and global regulators are
still attempting to keep pace with fintech research in the private sector.
The regulators’ roles in the new, decentralized future are still far from
clear, so many foreign jurisdictions have adopted a “wait and see”
approach to blockchain regulation. In these countries, financial regulators
are wary of impeding blockchain’s technological development and
instead work with industry stakeholders to ascertain the technology’s
capabilities.
The United Kingdom Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) has
adopted a particularly novel approach to blockchain regulation. The FCA
has created “regulatory sandboxes” where “businesses [can] test

194.
195.
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See COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, supra note 174, at 198.
See MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 165, at 11.
See Josh Stark, The Two Topics in Law and Blockchain, COINDESK (Jan. 14,
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199. See id.
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innovative products, . . . business models and delivery mechanisms.”200
These sandboxes serve as closed environments where startups can test
blockchain use without subjecting themselves to the entire suite of U.K.
financial regulation.201 Rather than forcing blockchain startups to assume
significant time and monetary costs to test new concepts in an uncertain
regulatory environment, the FCA has established an abbreviated process
through which approved entities can experiment with blockchains without
suffering the full repercussions of failure.
The FCA has determined several requirements for admission into the
sandbox. An applicant firm must be within the scope of the sandbox’s
objectives, demonstrate a clear innovation, deliver a consumer benefit,
have a need for sandbox testing, and be ready for testing.202 Once the firm
registers, it enjoys a more flexible interpretation of FCA rules; for
example, the FCA can issue regulatory guidance on a case-by-case basis
or even waive entire provisions depending on the parameters of a given
test. 203 The FCA believes that the relationship is mutually beneficial.
While startups and their customers benefit from the certainty that their
economic activity falls within legal boundaries, regulators obtain a wealth
of information to use going forward.204
Other international jurisdictions have adopted conciliatory
regulations for blockchain startups. 205 The Hong Kong Monetary
Authority (“HKMA”) has established its own sandbox to serve as a pilot
for fintech advancements, such as blockchain, augmented reality, and

200. See Regulatory Sandbox, U.K. FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY (Nov. 5, 2015), https:/
/www.fca.org.uk/firms/project-innovate-innovation-hub/regulatory-sandbox [https://per
ma.cc/H7F8-DDHC].
201. See Bloomberg View, Bring on the Blockchain Future, BLOOMBERG PROF.
SERVS. (June 13, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/bring-blockchai
n-future/ [https://perma.cc/5J3M-QKQD].
202. See Regulatory Sandbox, supra note 200.
203. See id.
204. See Christopher Woolard, Dir. of Strategy & Competition, FCA, Speech at the
Innovate Finance Global Summit (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.fca.org.uk/news/speeches
/innovate-finance-global-summit [https://perma.cc/97GZ-F6RD].
205. For a list of blockchain sandboxes, see Carlo R.W. De Meijer, Blockchain:
Playing in the Regulatory Sandbox, FINEXTRA (Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.finextra.com/
blogposting/13055/blockchain-playing-in-the-regulatory-sandbox [https://perma.cc/Y5
B3-E7CA].
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even robotics.206 The HKMA aims to provide regulatory flexibility while
still requiring participant firms to consider consumer protection and risk
mitigation. 207 The Australian Securities and Investment Commission
(“ASIC”) created an “Innovation Hub,” which it touts as a collaborative
effort between financial professionals, regulators, and academics. Like
the FCA, ASIC cites the costs startups face when testing a concept in a
large market.208 Fintech companies would normally need to register with
ASIC to do business but would incur additional costs by modifying their
business and registration status based on customer response. 209 ASIC
suggests that its flexible regulatory regime can mitigate the speed-tomarket problem. 210 Elsewhere in Asia, the Monetary Authority of
Singapore (“MAS”) has actively courted small and large blockchain
enterprises as part of the country’s broader Smart Nation initiative.211 For
example, MAS collaborated with the multi-firm blockchain consortium
R3 to establish a “Center of Excellence” for blockchain research.212
The unifying theme among global regulators is cooperation between
government and industry stakeholders. Unlike some of their international
counterparts, regulators in the United States have rejected proposals to
create their own regulatory sandboxes.213 But there are signs of public206. See Letter from Arthur Yuen, Deputy Chief Exec., H. K. Monetary Auth., to
Chief Execs., All Authorized Insts. (Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/
doc/key-information/guidelines-and-circular/2016/20160906e1.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3
S5-7LC6].
207. See id.
208. AUSTL. SEC. & INVS. COMM’N., FURTHER MEASURES TO FACILITATE
INNOVATION IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 10 (2016), http://download.asic.gov.au/media/3889
025/cp260-published-08-june-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AA9-UZJR].
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See Diana Ngo, Singapore Makes Blockchain a Priority, NASDAQ (Dec. 21,
2016), http://www.nasdaq.com/article/singapore-makes-blockchain-a-priority-cm7244
72 [https://perma.cc/URH9-2VVZ].
212. See Ian Allison, R3 Partners with Monetary Authority of Singapore, Launches
Asia Blockchain Centre of Excellence, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.ibti
mes.co.uk/r3-partners-monetary-authority-singapore-launches-asia-blockchain-centreexcellence-1590490 [https://perma.cc/24C9-P5KE].
213. See Gregory Roberts, Blockchain Not Ready for Regulatory Sandbox, Fed’s
Brainard Says, Bloomberg BNA (Oct. 11, 2016), https://www.bna.com/blockchain-notready-n57982078299/ [https://perma.cc/V3R4-3MZW]. Federal Reserve Governor Lael
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private cooperation, even if they do stop short of establishing testing
environments. In addition, the Blockchain Alliance serves as a publicprivate forum for the Digital Chamber of Commerce to work with fintech
companies to combat financial crimes that take place on blockchains.214
B. DERIVATIVES REGULATION UNDER DODD-FRANK AND THE
COMMODITIES EXCHANGE ACT
Derivatives contracts operate both as hedging devices and pure
wagers.215 Derivatives laws often struggle to find balance between these
two uses. Regulators often seek to curb over-speculation while accepting
the social benefits of derivatives.216 Prior to Dodd-Frank, the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) adopted a hands-off regulatory
approach to derivatives under the Commodity Futures Modernization Act
(“CFMA”) by excluding most OTC derivatives from regulation.217 DoddFrank repudiated the CFMA and instead imposed a series of requirements
designed to increase both market and transaction level transparency.218
Under Dodd-Frank, derivatives are subject to a fragmented
regulatory regime. The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
asserts jurisdiction over “security-based swaps,” 219 which Dodd-Frank
defines as swaps that are based on the underlying value of a security or
Brainard cited concerns about the maturity of the technology in rejecting a proposal for
a sandbox. Id.
214. See BLOCKCHAIN ALLIANCE, blockchainalliance.org [https://perma.cc/AAN5-P9
3F]. This organization connects law enforcement agencies with blockchain companies.
One issue facing the organization is the use of ransomware. By using ransomware, an
attacker locks down a computer system and prevents a user from accessing files unless
the victim pays money. Attackers often demand payment in Bitcoin, Litecoin, or other
cryptocurrency since the blockchains help them preserve anonymity. See Danny Palmer,
How Bitcoin Helped Fuel an Explosion in Ransomware Attacks, ZDNET (Aug. 22, 2016),
http://www.zdnet.com/article/how-bitcoin-helped-fuel-an-explosion-in-ransomware-att
acks/ [https://perma.cc/RWG8-VPNQ].
215. See Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis,
1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 6 (2011).
216. See id. at 11.
217. See id. at 21.
218. See M. Holland West & Matthew K. Kerfoot, The Impact of Dodd-Frank on
Derivatives, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 269, 272 (2013).
219. See 15 U.S.C. § 8302(a)(2) (2012).
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index of securities.220 The CFTC has regulatory authority over all other
types of swaps, including agricultural swaps.221 The two agencies share
authority over “mixed swaps,” which include components of securitybased swaps and other swaps.222 Dodd-Frank does not provide a single
definition for the term “swap” but lists instruments that are considered
swaps and delineates several considerations in determining whether a
transaction is a swap.223 While the CFTC is the primary regulator, DoddFrank also affords rulemaking authority to several “prudential
regulators.” 224 The prudential regulators include the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Farm
Credit Administration, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency.225
Title VII’s clearing requirements represent perhaps the most
consequential change to derivatives regulation. The Commodity
Exchange Act (“CEA”), as amended by Dodd-Frank, now prohibits
entering into a swap agreement unless that swap is submitted to a
derivatives clearing organization (“DCO”) or to an exempt clearinghouse
for clearing.226 Most DCOs must register with the CFTC. To do so, a
registrant must comply with the CEA’s seventeen core principles.227 Once

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

7 U.S.C. § 1a(42) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(68) (2012).
See 15 U.S.C. § 8302(a)(1) (2012).
See id. § 8302(a)(8).
See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1a(47), 1b(a) (2012).
See 7 U.S.C. § 1a(39) (2012).
See id.
See id. § 2(h)(1)(A).
See id. § 7a-1 (2012). The seventeen core principles compel a registrant to
maintain:
1. Adequate financial, operational, and managerial resources.
2. Appropriate standards for participant and product eligibility.
3. Adequate and appropriate risk management capabilities.
4. The ability to complete settlements on a timely basis under varying
circumstances.
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registered, DCOs are subject to CFTC rules regarding the implementation
of these principles. For example, the CFTC mandates that DCOs maintain
sufficiently liquid resources to continue to meet their financial obligations
notwithstanding the default of their largest clearing member.228 Agency
rulemaking also requires DCOs to adopt procedures to contain losses in
case of a clearing member’s default.229
5. Standards and procedures to protect member and participant funds.
6. Efficient and fair default rules and procedures.
7. Adequate rule enforcement and dispute resolution procedures.
8. Adequate and appropriate systems safeguards, emergency
procedures, and plan for disaster recovery.
9. Obligation to provide necessary reports to allow the CFTC to
oversee clearinghouse activities.
10. Maintenance of all business records for five years in a form
acceptable to the CFTC.
11. Publication of clearinghouse rules and operating procedures.
12. Participation in appropriate domestic and international
information-sharing agreements.
13. Avoidance of actions that are unreasonable restraints of trade or
that impose anti-competitive burdens.
14. Governance arrangements and fitness standards.
15. Rules to minimize conflicts of interest in the DCO’s decisionmaking process, and a process for resolving any conflicts.
16. Composition of governing boards to include market participants.
17. Well-founded legal framework for the activities of the DCO.
Clearing Organizations, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, http://www.cftc.
gov/industryoversight/clearingorganizations/index.htm [https://perma.cc/AJX9-Q7CS].
228. See 17 C.F.R. § 39.11(a)(1), (e) (2016).
229. See id. § 39.16.
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The CEA charges the CFTC with reviewing swaps and determining
whether they should be subject to mandatory clearing (these are called
“designated swaps”).230 The CFTC can independently review classes of
swaps and determine whether they should be subject to clearing; it can
also initiate review when a DCO submits reports of swaps it plans to clear.
The CEA lists a number of factors for the CFTC to consider in
determining whether to designate a swap for clearing. 231 The major
statutory exception to the CEA’s clearing requirements is known as the
commercial end-user exception. It applies to swaps where one
counterparty “(i) is not a financial entity; (ii) is using swaps to hedge or
mitigate commercial risk; and (iii) notifies the Commission . . . how it
generally meets its financial obligations associated with entering into
non-cleared swaps.”232 The exception is designed for non-financial users
who use the swap for hedging purposes and can sufficiently prove their
ability to meet their obligations. Invoking this exception is optional, and
the decision to do so rests entirely on the counterparty meeting all three
criteria.233
Even if a class of swaps is required for clearing and not subject to an
exception or exemption, some highly customized OTC derivatives lack
sufficient liquidity to be accepted for clearing. For these swaps, DoddFrank requires the Prudential Regulators to propose unified margin
requirements for uncleared swaps within their scope of authority.234 In
addition, the CFTC and the SEC are charged with issuing their own
margin requirements for uncleared swaps that are not subject to Prudential
Regulator oversight.235
Once trades are cleared, or granted an exemption, they are subject to
Dodd-Frank’s post-trade reporting and document retention requirements.
The amended CEA requires all swaps, whether cleared or uncleared, to
be reported to a swap data repository (“SDR”).236 According to CFTC
regulation, swap participants are also subject to ongoing reporting
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

See 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1) (2012).
See id. § 2(h)(2)(D).
Id. § 2(h)(7)(A).
See id. § 2(h)(7)(B).
See id. § 6s(e)(2)(A).
See id. § 6s(e)(2)(B).
See id. § 2(a)(13)(G).
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obligations. At the outset, reporting parties must send electronic swap
creation data to SDRs.237 Swap creation data includes data regarding the
agreement’s terms. 238 In addition, reporting parties must send
continuation data to SDRs.239 This includes data concerning any changes
to the swap’s economic terms, including data pertaining to life cycle
events and valuation.240
III. BLOCKCHAIN’S IMPACT ON SYSTEMIC RISK
Depending on the technology’s development, blockchains could
radically revamp the market structure for derivatives trades. Existing
regulations may not be sufficient to address the risks posed by a
blockchain derivatives market. It is difficult, and arguably
counterproductive, at this stage of the blockchain’s development to
suggest concrete proposals for new rules. Instead, this part argues that
systemic risk is the primary concern driving current derivatives regulation
and that a new regulatory scheme must consider blockchain’s unique
risks. This part argues that CCPs, while generally seen as an effective way
to reduce systemic risk, partially create risk by creating large central
entities that are subject to failure. While blockchains can reduce the risk
of over-centralization, this part warns that blockchain technology may
create systemic risks of a different nature. Regulators must consider these
risks when determining how to govern blockchain markets.
A. CENTRALIZATION AND SYSTEMIC RISK
One of regulators’ chief concerns regarding derivatives is their role
in enhancing financial systemic risk.241 There is no single definition for
systemic risk. Oftentimes, it is defined according to its consequences:
bank runs, payment crises, failures of interconnected firms, and general

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

See 17 C.F.R. § 45.3 (2016).
See id. § 45.1.
See id. § 45.4.
See id. §§ 45.1, 45.4.
See Regulatory Reform and the Derivatives Market, Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, 111th Cong. 3 (2009) (statement of Tom
Harkin, Chairman of S. Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry).
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distrust in the financial system. 242 Alternatively, systemic risk may be
expressed in terms of potential causes, such as a company being “too big
to fail, too interconnected to fail, or too leveraged to fail.”243
Systemic risk is traditionally associated with institutional failure.
Banks and other financial intermediaries provide market access, so
widespread institutional failure can increase costs of capital.244 Bank runs
can signal institutional systemic risk.245 A panic among depositors can
trigger requests for withdrawals, and because banking assets are primarily
long term, banks do not hold enough cash to satisfy demands.246 This can
force some banks into bankruptcy, but since banks often lend to one
another, a defaulting bank can renege on its obligations to another
institution. 247 In a panic, multiple defaults can reverberate across the
entire industry, ultimately causing a “domino effect” of failures.248
Despite its strengths, the central clearing model is viewed skeptically
by many commentators. Dodd-Frank skeptics suggest that it is unclear
whether the concentration of risk in central entities is ultimately good or
bad for systemic risk. The blockchain’s potential to distribute tasks
traditionally conducted by CCPs reopens the discussion about risks posed
by centralization. 249 This worldwide mandate saddles CCPs with
hundreds of trillions of dollars’ worth of additional trades that would not
have required clearing prior to the financial crisis.250

242.
243.

See SCALCIONE, supra note 130, at 85-87.
See Perspectives on Systemic Risk, Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Capital
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the Comm. of Financial
Services, 111th Cong. 2 (2009) (statement by Paul Kanjorski, Chairman of the Subcomm.
on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises).
244. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 Geo. L.J. 193, 199 (2008).
245. See SCALCIONE, supra note 130, at 85.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See Mark J. Roe, Clearinghouse Overconfidence, 6 CAL. L. REV. 1641, 1675
(2013).
250. See Hester Plumridge, What if a Clearinghouse Failed?, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2,
2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240529702043977045770740239397106
52 [https://perma.cc/59ZT-PG85].
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By their very function, CCPs are inherently interconnected to
numerous financial institutions.251 In a way, “clearing has turned out to be
the Mother of All Interconnections, because every big financial institution
is connected to all big CCPs, and . . . everyone has to funnel the bulk of
their derivatives trades through clearinghouses.” 252 The CCP’s
membership will almost invariably consist of large firms that, in turn,
have their own large customers.253 While margin calls and loss sharing
rules can alleviate some of the stress of a member firm’s failure, CCPs
are still vulnerable to failures by particularly large member firms that
serve multiple functions.254 In addition to serving as general members,
some members serve as depository banks, custodians, and settlement
banks.255 During a crisis, these firms must manage their own operations
in addition to supporting the CCP with variation margins.256
The problem is compounded by CCPs’ mandated acceptance of
swaps that are comparatively less liquid. The relative illiquidity of certain
types of swaps can sometimes make variation margin calculation an
imperfect science, as the CCPs would need to introduce models into their
pricing formulae. 257 In a worst-case scenario, multi-function clearing
members could default and fail to meet variation margin requirements on
time.258 As a result, the clearing mandate could leave CCPs vulnerable to
liquidity shortages during periods of financial stress.259 Such a shortage
would compromise the CCPs’ ability to meet their obligations towards
251. See Hester Peirce, Derivatives Clearinghouses: Clearing the Way to Failure, 64
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 589, 621 (2013).
252. Craig Pirrong, The Fifth Year of Frankendodd, STREETWISE PROFESSOR (July 21,
2015), http://streetwiseprofessor.com/?p=9472 [https://perma.cc/FF6B-WX7C].
253. See Peirce, supra note 251, at 621.
254. See Froukelien Wendt, Central Counterparties: Addressing Their Too Important
to Fail Nature 9 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/15/21, 2015), https://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp1521.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5K3-H64T].
255. See id.
256. See id.
257. See Griffith, supra note 122, at 1316.
258. See Patrick Parkinson, Remarks Delivered to Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Annual Over the Counter Derivatives Symposium: CCP Liquidity Risk Management and
Related Failure Management Issues 2-3 (2014), https://www.chicagofed.org/~/media/oth
ers/events/2014/annual-over-the-counter-derivatives-symposium/parkinson-ccp-derivati
ves-over-the-counter-2014-pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/G55U-MJF8].
259. See Pirrong, supra note 252.
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non-defaulting members. These events do not occur in a vacuum; a CCP’s
failure to meet its obligations could undermine confidence in the markets
in which it provides clearing services.260 Thus, its failure could very well
result in the type of financial contagion that it was designed to protect
against in the first place.
The blockchain’s decentralization of clearing functions could reduce
the risks posed by excessive centralization. One of the guiding tenets of
the blockchain is its lack of a single point of failure. The ideal blockchainbased system can decentralize key clearing functions and distribute those
tasks among members of the network. Blockchain entrepreneurs are
optimistic that smart contracts can automate integral processes including
matching and affirmation, collateral management, default management,
and settlement.261 The results of this could be profound, as CCPs would
play a diminished role or even be displaced altogether. Skeptics note that
blockchains cannot replicate every CCP process; CCPs mutualize default
risk and manage positions in a way that blockchains presently cannot.262
While it may currently be the case that blockchains cannot emulate the
diverse array of CCP functions, the potential benefits of disintermediation
could be too tantalizing to ignore. Blockchains can be incorporated into
existing processes for efficiency gains, and industry partnerships and new
startups are constantly pushing the technology towards greater levels of
disintermediation.
B. THE SYSTEMIC RISKS POSED BY DECENTRALIZED SYSTEMS
Blockchain evangelists continue to make advancements to the
technology through industry-wide cooperation on research. As practical
application of the technology comes closer to fruition, the CFTC and its
international counterparts must consider whether the current regulatory
paradigms can apply to this new technology. If the technology lives up to
the lofty expectations posed by some of its enthusiastic entrepreneurs,
then certain requirements, such as mandated central clearing, could
become obsolete. Certain markets, such as those for uncleared OTC
swaps, would be far more transparent than they are today. 263 While
260.
261.
262.

See Parkinson, supra note 258, at 3.
See Parsons, supra note 181.
See Craig Pirrong, A Pitch Perfect Illustration of Blockchain Hype, COINDESK
(Oct. 16, 2016), http://www.coindesk.com/a-pitch-perfect-illustration-of-blockchain-hy
pe/ [https://perma.cc/AH6L-YZ46].
263. See COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, supra note 174, at 195.
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regulators and market participants may salivate over blockchain’s
potential, they must also realize this change in market structure is not a
riskless proposition. Although the risks of over-centralization are welldocumented in legal scholarship and blockchain’s disintermediation of
settlement procedures seems to directly address those concerns, this
decentralized structure comes with risks of its own.
Though it may be too early to pose a new regulatory regime, there
are some themes to evaluate when considering ways to regulate
blockchain markets. Systemic risk will still exist in blockchain markets;
only the sources of systemic risk will change. Decentralization of market
intermediaries shifts regulatory concern from the systemic risks created
by interconnected institutions to those inherent in the market itself. In
addition, such a heavy reliance on digital trading infrastructure suggests
that the market structure could be a source of risk.
The CFTC should focus on its regulatory prerogative to reduce
systemic risk, which has taken precedence since the enactment of DoddFrank. 264 Regulators must account for the unique risks posed by a
decentralized network. They can do so by addressing issues regarding
settlement finality and recourse, especially in the context of potential
cyberattacks on the blockchain network. In addition, regulators should be
cognizant of the type of behavior that could arise as market participants
take advantage of the blockchain’s efficiencies. The CFTC should remain
vigilant in requiring reporting by swap participants. Blockchains can
enhance this functionality if regulations are updated to allow reporting
through the shared ledger.265
Blockchain transactions lack certain crucial elements of traditional
legal agreements. They are transparent and easily verifiable. For example,
to allow communal payment verification to take place, Bitcoin attempts
to ensure that transactions are irrevocable—no single user could reverse
a transaction after it is entered into the blockchain ledger. But the
unidirectional nature of these transactions becomes a liability in the event
of a disputed transaction. Bitcoin manages to prevent illegitimate
264. See generally Perspectives on Systemic Risk: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Financial Services, 111th Cong. (2009).
265. See Jenny Cieplak & Mike Gill, How Distributed Ledgers Impact Post-Trade in
a Dodd-Frank World, COINDESK (July 9, 2016), http://www.coindesk.com/distributedledger-cftc-post-trade-dodd-frank/ [https://perma.cc/7TG7-VBXV].
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payments, but this is of little use if the transfer is based on fraudulent
pretenses to begin with.266 Even after the transaction is finalized, if a court
orders damages arising from, for example, a fraudulent transfer, the initial
transaction is not “undone,” per se. Instead, the party that must pay the
damage award would initiate a new transaction in the amount owed, or
face further judicial sanctions. 267 The Bitcoin blockchain itself cannot
resolve this problem internally; it must rely on other remedies, such as
those imposed judicially, to deal with fraudulent transfers.
Immutability, despite being an important part of Bitcoin
functionality, is a malleable concept. Once a transaction is finalized and
placed into the public ledger, a subsequent, prohibited transaction, such
as a double spend, would fail scrutiny under the proof of work process.
But since blockchains are, in effect, communal verification mechanisms,
it is possible for cabals of bad actors to impose their version of the truth
onto the network. This problem can manifest itself through the
blockchain’s main technological vulnerability, called the “51% attack.”268
The basic premise of this exploit is that if a single attacker or group of
attackers controlled more than 50% of the blockchain’s computing power,
they could produce hashes at a fast-enough rate to overwrite other users’
transactions. 269 Thus, a malicious user that controls 51% of the
blockchain’s mining hash-rate could theoretically send a transaction and
then reverse it.270 The blockchain would suggest that this malicious user
still possessed an asset when, in fact, that asset had just been transferred.

266.
267.

See SWAN, supra note 16.
See John Servidio, Blockchain: Why It Matters for Financial Services Lawyers,
LAW360 (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/830173/blockchain-why-itmatters-for-financial-services-lawyers [https://perma.cc/XYT3-KHMS]. Court orders
and subpoenas can present other problems with privacy and data security. Though
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on the Law and Blockchain, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 11, 2016), http://www.lexology.com/librar
y/detail.aspx?g=ee10aa0f-3447-4088-81dd-7521244fecb3 [https://perma.cc/7BDG-DJ
9L].
268. See Weaknesses, BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Weaknesses [https://pe
rma.cc/QW7Y-BXJM] (describing the capabilities of a Bitcoin attacker with more than
50% of a network’s computing power).
269. See id.
270. See id.
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Undoing blockchain errors is not a simple task. As of this writing,
the highest profile attack and attempted resolution of a blockchain attack
involved Ethereum. The attack on Ethereum was not a 51% attack but
rather an exploit in the programming language that facilitates smart
contract creation.271 This attack is perhaps the greatest security challenge
to a cryptocurrency to date. Some observers attribute the attack to the
flexibility Ethereum affords its users. 272 While Bitcoin’s programming
language is sufficient to effectuate relatively simple currency
transactions, Ethereum allows users to use several languages to create
more sophisticated agreements. 273 Some suggest that this led to
vulnerabilities in the underlying smart contract code. 274 The attacker
managed to drain millions of Ether from Ethereum’s largest distributed
autonomous organization—a crowdfunding pool named, “The DAO.”275
Users who invested in The DAO’s projects quite literally watched, on the
blockchain, as the attacker siphoned off funds to another address.276 In an
open letter to Ethereum’s users, the hacker took refuge in the immutability
of the smart contract by suggesting that he or she cannot be subject to any
additional legal obligations beyond those codified in the coded
agreements at issue.277
The legal merit of such a claim is far from clear, but Ethereum
nonetheless took action by creating a “fork.”278 Ethereum blacklisted the
offending addresses and offered a firmware update to its remaining user
base.279 This solution effectively created two blockchains: one with the
most recent update and another that was theoretically obsolete. 280 Of
271. See David Siegal, Understanding the DAO Attack, COINDESK (June 25, 2016),
http://www.coindesk.com/understanding-dao-hack-journalists/ [https://perma.cc/BB7RBZHA].
272. See id.
273. See id.
274. See Joseph Young, Ethereum Smart Contract Issues Frustrate Developers with
Fatal Bugs, CRYPTOCOINS NEWS (Nov. 12, 2016), https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/eth
ereum-smart-contract-issues-frustrate-developers-fatal-bugs/ [https://perma.cc/BSH4-L
5NH].
275. See id.
276. See id.
277. See id.
278. See Siegal, supra note 271.
279. Id.
280. See id.

298

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXII

course, the viability of a blockchain fork depends on the users installing
the update; Ethereum cannot compel users to do so. An attacker can
exploit this vulnerability by promising users incentives to remain on the
old version of the blockchain.281 The long-term effects of this solution are
unclear. On the one hand, the hard fork splits the community, and an
intervention of this magnitude could undermine faith in the currency
going forward. Then again, a hard fork is perhaps the more palatable
solution compared to the alternative of losing millions. Critics question
how the fork will affect the perception of Ethereum and blockchains as
secure payment mechanisms going forward, with some going so far as to
call it a bailout.282
The concerns about cyber-attacks and the Ethereum fork bring to
light one of the main disputes regarding blockchains: the notion of
settlement finality. Broadly speaking, settlement finality is the moment at
which a transaction becomes final and irreversible. 283 Finality is
important to financial firms because it provides certainty as to when assets
are legally theirs.284 Parties thus rely on the concreteness of finality to
determine asset ownership and monitor risks.285
Blockchains challenge traditional notions of finality. As Ethereum
founder Vitalik Buterin writes, “decentralized systems . . . may
[definitively provide settlement finality], or they may provide it
probabilistically, within certain economic bounds, or not at all.” 286
Depending on the design of the blockchain, finality can be amorphous. In
a consensus-based proof of work system, it is difficult to predict the future
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See id.
See id.; Frances Coppola, A Painful Lesson for the Ethereum Community,
FORBES (July 21, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2016/07/21/a-pain
ful-lesson-for-the-ethereum-community/#58f1bc435714 [https://perma.cc/WQH7-33
NH].
283. See DAVID MILLS ET AL., DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY IN PAYMENTS,
CLEARING, AND SETTLEMENT 31 (2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/fed
s/2016/files/2016095pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YL2-Q9UN].
284. See Vitalik Buterin, On Settlement Finality, ETHEREUM (May 9, 2016),
https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/05/09/on-settlement-finality/ [https://perma.cc/U25Q-R
ATW].
285. See MILLS ET AL., supra note 283, at 32.
286. See Buterin, supra note 284.
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security of a transaction that has been incorporated into a block.287 There
is always the possibility that an actor or several actors working in concert
could assume most of the blockchain’s mining power, giving them the
ability to rewrite blocks and undo previously settled transactions. 288
While the term “51% attack” likely evokes images of an attack by a flood
of hackers, such an attack need not originate from external actors.
Consider Bitcoin’s blockchain, where the difficulty of the proof of work
problem largely depends on the network assigning a target value.289 The
blockchain sets the target value, and this determines the difficulty of the
proof of work problem. Recall that Bitcoin assigns the target according to
the number of miners on the network; the proof of work problem thus
becomes more difficult as more people connect to the network and
become stakeholders. 290 This creates a situation where the “level of
security . . . is directly proportional to the future value of the token, which
is unknowable.” 291 As the difficulty of the proof of work problem
changes, transactions may become easier (or more difficult) to reverse.
Many blockchain stakeholders suggest that using private or
consortium blockchains sufficiently mitigates this problem. Bitcoin and
Ethereum use public blockchains, allowing any person with a computer
to download the client, participate in the mining process, and read the
ledger. 292 The consensus process and the determination of the
blockchain’s truth is left up to the public via cryptography and economic
incentives.293 Conversely, private blockchains tightly control access via a
central administrator.294 The administrator can distribute read permissions
287. See Tim Swanson, Settlement Risks Involving Public Blockchains, TABB FORUM
(Mar. 24, 2016), http://tabbforum.com/opinions/settlement-risks-involving-public-block
chains [https://perma.cc/WFH6-PYJH].
288. See id.
289. See NAKAMOTO, supra note 1, at 3.
290. See id.
291. See Swanson, supra note 287.
292. See Vitalik Buterin, On Public and Private Blockchains, ETHEREUM (Aug. 7,
2015), https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/08/07/on-public-and-private-blockchains/ [https:/
/perma.cc/T2AY-38L9].
293. See id.
294. See Luke Parker, Public Versus Private Blockchains: Is There Room for Both to
Prevail?, MAGNR BLOG (Apr. 21, 2016), https://magnr.com/blog/technology/private-vspublic-blockchains-bitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/328A-4NZB].
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(the ability to view the blockchain) to pre-approved parties.295 Ultimately,
however, only the administrator can write (or input) new transactions to
the blockchain. 296 Consortium blockchains serve as something of a
middle ground between the two extremes: they allow consensus by
permitting only a certain number of trusted nodes to engage in the
verification process.297 Because a consortium blockchain requires some
element of pre-screening and familiarity among participants in the
consensus process, members can hold one another accountable for
modifications to the ledger. Consortium blockchains cannot completely
resolve finality issues, however. For example, a blockchain cannot
prevent collusion among members of a settlement consortium.298 There
are historical examples of collusion among financial firms, including the
notable and relatively recent case of LIBOR rate manipulation among
London banks.299
The lack of transaction finality can be a major source of systemic
risk in a decentralized system. As disintermediation occurs, systemic risk
“should increasingly be viewed by its impact on markets, not
institutions.”300 Risks of this nature increase costs of capital for market
participants, even if an initial shock occurs at an institution that is not a
major source of market access.301 Ideally, financial institutions insulate
themselves from risk through diversification; they invest in assets that
have a negative correlation, or no correlation, to each other and the
market.302 The net result should be a portfolio that has little to no net risk.
A market-based systemic risk can be positively correlated with the
market. For example, Steven Schwarcz considers the near-failure of the
295.
296.
297.
298.

See id.
See id.
See Buterin, supra note 292.
See Phil Gomes, A Morning Exploration of Blockchain Technology in Financial
Services, EDELMAN (Nov. 23, 2016), http://www.edelman.com/post/exploration-blockch
ain-technology-financial-services/ [https://perma.cc/XK35-ACNL].
299. See Liam Vaughan & Gavin Finch, Libor Scandal: The Bankers Who Fixed the
World’s Most Important Number, GUARDIAN (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.theguardian.c
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nt-number [https://perma.cc/U394-F422].
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infamous hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (“LTCM”) as an
illustration of this type of risk. While LCTM perhaps suffered from some
“hubris” by taking on increasing amounts of leverage, its diversified
positions ultimately failed “as the entire market moved in the same
direction at the same time.”303 Thus, instead of its losses being offset, they
were magnified and transmitted to its counterparties through its
derivatives positions.304
A lack of finality is a type of systemic risk that affects the market.
Without a clearly defined moment of finality, it may be difficult to
determine liability if a participant in a blockchain agreement suffers
insolvency.305 The Bank for International Settlements’ Core Principles for
Systemically Important Payment Systems call for definitive finality
because participants can face liquidity risk if they are unable to transfer
the settlement asset for another claim.306 This can have systemic effects
because “all participants holding the settlement asset are [simultaneously
exposed to liquidity risk] and . . . market participants can have little
control over the timing and size of their holding of the settlement asset.”307
In adopting its own settlement finality directive, the then European
Commission recognized that without definitive finality, the insolvency of
a single participant could cause liquidity concerns across an entire
payment, which would in turn undermine confidence in the entire
market.308 Ensuring definitive finality can be a way to foster confidence
in markets309 and prevent the positively correlated market movements that
would occur from a loss in confidence (which would render hedging
positions ineffective).
Regulators can provide clarity around finality. While it is perhaps
too early in the blockchain’s technological life to create a new and
specifically tailored regime for settlement finality, it is possible to
303. William McDonough, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Statement Before
the Comm. on Banking & Fin. Servs. (Oct. 1, 1998).
304. See Schwarcz, supra note 244, at 201.
305. See MILLS ET AL., supra note 283, at 31.
306. See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR SYSTEMICALLY
IMPORTANT PAYMENT SYSTEMS 31 (2001), http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d43.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/T8RF-KSLZ].
307. Id. at 34.
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envision ways in which the current regulatory regime can adapt to
changes in market infrastructure. Regulators cannot rest on their laurels
and expect the blockchain to resolve every problem. To the contrary, in
some ways, it appears that decentralizing clearing and settlement
processes substitutes one type of systemic risk for another. Under a
centralized clearing structure, the primary source of systemic risk stems
from a crucial intermediary’s exposure to other institutions. In a
decentralized and distributed blockchain system, systemic risks will
likely come from losses in market confidence caused by disputes in
finality.
The idea that regulators could serve as limited permission nodes on
the blockchain is commonly floated among the blockchain community.310
This potentially gives regulators access to a wealth of data that they would
otherwise not have, even under the current reporting regime. The ledger
itself can serve as the record for swap transactions, and can store both
creation and ongoing data required by the CFTC’s reporting rules.311 This
arrangement can result in major efficiencies. Currently, there are four
CFTC-registered SDRs, each of which uses different software and
reporting architecture, making it difficult for the CFTC to aggregate and
analyze data. 312 A blockchain consisting of prominent market participants
could comply with the requirements and provide transparency in the form
of viewable, standardized data.313
The nature of blockchains and the potential risk factors associated
with their use suggest that regulators may need to be even more proactive
in adapting the current regulatory scheme to the emerging technology.
Mitigating systemic risk in blockchain systems will likely require
regulators to set new standards for the underlying smart contracts. This
may require the CFTC and other agencies to take a hands on approach to
cyber security issues and problems relating to the blockchain’s
technological infrastructure.
310. See Nikiforos Matthews & Jonas Robison, Recent Blockchain Regulatory
Developments, ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE: DERIVATIVES REV. (Jan. 31, 2017),
http://blogs.orrick.com/derivatives/2017/01/31/recent-blockchain-regulatory-developme
nts/ [https://perma.cc/P45Z-ZXSR].
311. See 17 C.F.R. § 45.3 (2016).
312. See Cieplak & Gill, supra note 265.
313. See id.
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Smart contracts and blockchains are financial innovations that
regulators must stay ahead of. If derivatives markets move to blockchain
architecture, counterparties could adopt new types of agreements. While
financial innovation is typically thought of in terms of the development
of new products, advances in market structure can achieve the same result.
Financial innovation can occur when there are changes in markets and
intermediaries that affect the way that counterparties manage risk.314 This
is founded in Ronald Coase’s economic theory, which suggests that firms
and markets are substitutes for economic production and that, without
transaction costs, economic production would occur entirely through
markets.315 New products create ways for actors to move their risks to
markets; while bespoke at first, the market’s demand for these instruments
leads to standardized, liquid forms of these arrangements.316
Thus, a fundamental change to the market’s technological
infrastructure could also be characterized as financial innovation in this
sense. The blockchain promises to simplify the creation of new
instruments. Swap creators can easily emulate the term structures of other
securities and use the blockchain’s computational power to automatically
make appropriate margin adjustments. Blockchain’s proponents suggest
that this will lead to the creation of new types of agreements, allowing
firms to transfer new types of risk.317 While this provides a way for firms
to move more risks off their balance sheets, the usual result of financial
innovation is information asymmetry between market participants and
regulators.318 Typically, the source of the asymmetry is the regulators’
inability to ascertain the risks posed by these new instruments;
standardization can be a way to reduce these asymmetries. 319
Blockchains, however, provide something of a twist to this formula.
Regulators can mitigate some of the risks posed by the terms of the new
instruments by serving as nodes, but the contract’s code can serve as a
new source of risk.
Until smart contracts become industry staples, the CFTC should
closely scrutinize them. ISDA currently plays a prominent role in contract
standardization, but smart contracts may necessitate an additional level of
review in their early lives. The Ethereum situation is an interesting case
314.
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study in the potential pitfalls of smart contract vulnerability. Since the
hack occurred relatively recently, the long-term effects on user
confidence in the Ethereum network are unclear. But given the potentially
systemic repercussions that the lack of finality can have on the market,
regulators may not want to take risks with the new technology. One way
to cut off a source of risk would be to regulate the smart contracts
themselves, in the same way that CFTC regulation compels reporting of
swap terms to SDRs. The unique risks posed by smart contracts may
additionally require the CFTC to review the underlying smart contract
code to screen for vulnerabilities.
CONCLUSION
Blockchain technology is still very much evolving. Both finance
firms and regulators are still exploring the specific ways in which
blockchains can benefit capital markets. At this stage, it is perhaps best
that regulators allow the technology to develop in its natural course. At
the same time, it would benefit regulators to remain on the legal cutting
edge by understanding the potential promises and pitfalls of the
technology. The efficiencies provided by blockchains are substantial, as
they could reduce transaction costs across the board for derivatives
market participants. They can also remove or reduce reliance on central
counterparties that are exposed to large amounts of credit risk. But
blockchains are not without problems of their own. Technological
vulnerabilities can create new systemic risks, which regulators must be
prepared to mitigate before a financial crisis occurs. The specifics of any
prophylactic measures will largely depend on how the technology
develops, but what is clear right now is that an analysis of blockchains’
systemic risks will likely require an understanding of data and code as
much as of finance and the law.

